DL logoDaniel Lightsey

Research

My Research

Fundamentality and Language

The fundamental connects to the nonfundamental in some way. Some consider the relationship to be more metaphysical, others see the relationship as representational or linguistic. It seems to me that the latter is correct way to conceptualize the relationship between the fundamental and nonfundamental, so one of the research questions I seek to address concerns what exactly this representational relation is that holds between the fundamental and the nonfundamental. There is also the question of how well our language correctly mirrors the fundamental structure of the world, and whether there is any determinate matter of fact of how we should represent fundamental reality---my research also seeks to address this question.

Idealism and Phenomenalism

Idealism is, roughly, the thesis that the physical world is constituted by (grounded by) the mental; or (again roughly), that every physical fact is ultimately constituted by (grounded by) mental facts. Idealism has fallen on hard times recently, but, I think, not for good reason; indeed, I think there is a lot to be said for it. In particular, I am interested in whether phenomenalism---roughly, the thesis that physical facts and objects are constituted by (grounded by) actual and potential phenomenal facts---can provide an adequate account of physical facts and objects, and whether one can deduce all the physical facts from the phenomenal facts (modulo, perhaps, indexical and "that's all" facts). Phenomenalism provides us with an account of the nature of physical objects that is immediately epistemically accessible and removes the need to account for the obscure intrinsic nature of matter; for this reason, among others, the plausibility of phenomenalism is one of the questions of my research.

The Structure and Nature of Content

The content of our thought seems readily available to us. I know what I am thinking about at any given time, and I know this directly; I also know, or I have the potential to know, the myriad of phenomenal experiences I experience at any moment. We should, then, be able to reconstruct the content of our thoughts by examining our own conscious experience and determining what judgments when come to in certain hypothetical situations (or thought experiments). One of my research questions is to determine to what extent this picture is plausible. That is, to determine whether the structure of the content of our thoughts is determined by how we combine certain concepts together, and whether the nature of this content simply consists of our phenomenal experience.

Areas of Interest

Academic Profiles

Works in Progress

Presentations and Talks